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　本紙１１月２５日号３面に掲載した「NHK職場のパワハラ」と題した記事（http://jcj-daily.seesaa.net/article/505948616.html）は、職場の上司の部長からパワハラを受けたNHKグローバルメディアサービスのデジタルニュース部門に所属する非正規職員・原田勤さん（元埼玉新聞記者）自らその実態を明らかにしている。　そのパワハラは①２０２２年４月、ＮＨＫニュースウェブの原稿の校閲作業中に難癖をつけに来た部長（元NHK社会部記者）がいきなり校閲..

It’s critical that copyright be balanced with limitations that support users’ rights, and perhaps no limitation is more important than fair use. Critics, humorists, artists, and activists all must have rights to re-use and re-purpose source material, even when it’s copyrighted. 

Yesterday, EFF weighed in on another case that could shape the future of our fair use rights. In Sedlik v. Von Drachenberg, a Los Angeles tattoo artist created a tattoo based on a well-known photograph of Miles Davis taken by photographer Jeffrey Sedlik. A jury found that Von Drachenberg, the tattoo artist, did not infringe the photographer’s copyright because her version was different from the photo; it didn’t meet the legal threshold of “substantially similar.” After the trial, the judge in the case considered other arguments brought by Sedlik after the trial and upheld the jury’s findings. 

On appeal, Sedlik has made arguments that, if upheld, could narrow fair use rights for everyone. The appeal brief suggests that only secondary users who make “targeted” use of a copyrighted work have strong fair use defenses, relying on an incorrect reading of the Supreme Court’s decision in Andy Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith. 

Fair users select among various alternatives, for both aesthetic and practical reasons.

Such a reading would upend decades of Supreme Court precedent that makes it clear that “targeted” fair uses don’t get any special treatment as opposed to “untargeted” uses. As made clear in Warhol, the copying done by fair users must simply be “reasonably necessary” to achieve a new purpose. The principle of protecting new artistic expressions and new innovations is what led the Supreme Court to protect video cassette recording as fair use in 1984. It also contributed to the 2021 decision in Oracle v. Google, which held that Google’s copying of computer programming conventions created for desktop computers, in order to make it easier to design for modern smartphones, was a type of fair use. 

Sedlik argues that if a secondary user could have chosen another work, this means they did not “target” the original work, and thus the user should have a lessened fair use case. But that has never been the rule. As the Supreme Court explained, Warhol could have created art about a product other than Campbell’s Soup; but his choice to copy the famous Campbell’s logo was fully justified because it was “well known to the public, designed to be reproduced, and a symbol of an everyday item for mass consumption.” 

Fair users always select among various alternatives, for both aesthetic and practical reasons. A film professor might know of several films that expertly demonstrate a technique, but will inevitably choose just one to show in class. A news program alerting viewers to developing events may have access to many recordings of the event from different sources, but will choose just one, or a few, based on editorial judgments. Software developers must make decisions about which existing software to analyze or to interoperate with in order to build on existing technology. 

The idea of penalizing these non-“targeted” fair uses would lead to absurd results, and we urge the 9th Circuit to reject this argument. 

Finally, Sedlik also argues that the tattoo artist’s social media posts are necessarily “commercial” acts, which would push the tattoo art further away from fair use. Artists’ use of social media to document their processes and work has become ubiquitous, and such an expansive view of commerciality would render the concept meaningless. That’s why multiple appellate courts have already rejected such a view; the 9th Circuit should do so as well. 

In order for innovation and free expression to flourish in the digital age, fair use must remain a flexible rule that allows for diverse purposes and uses. 

Further Reading: 

• EFF Amicus Brief in Sedlik v. Von Drachenberg 

　１９７０年代、小中学校で集団予防接種が実施されていました。当然ですが予防接種は少数ですが被害者を発生させるものです。

A federal appeals court just gave software developers, and users, an early holiday present, holding that software updates aren’t necessarily “derivative,” for purposes of copyright law, just because they are designed to interoperate the software they update.

This sounds kind of obscure, so let’s cut through the legalese. Lots of developers build software designed to interoperate with preexisting works. This kind of interoperability is crucial to innovation, particularly in a world where a small number of companies control so many essential tools and platforms. If users want to be able to repair, improve, and secure their devices, they must be able to rely on third parties to help. Trouble is, Big Tech companies want to be able to control (and charge for) every possible use of the devices and software they “sell” you – and they won’t hesitate to use the law to enforce that control. 

Courts shouldn’t assist, but unfortunately a federal district court did just that in the latest iteration of Oracle v. Rimini. Rimini provides support to improve the use and security of Oracle products, so customers don’t have to depend entirely on Oracle itself . Oracle doesn’t want this kind of competition, so it sued Rimini for copyright infringement, arguing that a software update Rimini developed was a “derivative work” because it was intended to interoperate with Oracle's software, even though the update didn’t use any of Oracle’s copyrightable code. Derivative works are typically things like a movie based on a novel, or a translation of that novel. Here, the only “derivative” aspect was that Rimini’s code was designed to interact with Oracle’s code.  
 
Unfortunately, the district court initially sided with Oracle, setting a dangerous precedent. If a work is derivative, it may infringe the copyright in the preexisting work from which it, well, derives. For decades, software developers have relied, correctly, on the settled view that a work is not derivative under copyright law unless it is substantially similar to a preexisting work in both ideas and expression. Thanks to that rule, software developers can build innovative new tools that interact with preexisting works, including tools that improve privacy and security, without fear that the companies that hold rights in those preexisting works would have an automatic copyright claim to those innovations.  

Rimini appealed to the Ninth Circuit, on multiple grounds. EFF, along with a diverse group of stakeholders representing consumers, small businesses, software developers, security researchers, and the independent repair community, filed an amicus brief in support explaining that the district court ruling on interoperability was not just bad policy, but also bad law.  

 The Ninth Circuit agreed: 

In effect, the district court adopted an “interoperability” test for derivative works—if a product can only interoperate with a preexisting copyrighted work, then it must be derivative. But neither the text of the Copyright Act nor our precedent supports this interoperability test for derivative works. 

 The court goes on to give a primer on the legal definition of derivative work, but the key point is this: a work is only derivative if it “substantially incorporates the other work.”

Copyright already reaches far too broadly, giving rightsholders extraordinary power over how we use everything from music to phones to televisions. This holiday season, we’re raising a glass to the judges who sensibly reined that power in. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has failed to address six out of six main privacy protections for three of its border surveillance programs—surveillance towers, aerostats, and unattended ground sensors—according to a new assessment by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

In the report, GAO compared the policies for these technologies against six of the key Fair Information Practice Principles that agencies are supposed to use when evaluating systems and processes that may impact privacy, as dictated by both Office of Management and Budget guidance and the Department of Homeland Security's own rules.

These include:

• Data collection. "DHS should collect only PII [Personally Identifiable Information] that is directly relevant and necessary to accomplish the specified purpose(s)."
• Purpose specification. "DHS should specifically articulate the purpose(s) for which the PII is intended to be used."
• Information sharing. "Sharing PII outside the department should be for a purpose compatible with the purpose for which the information was collected."
• Data security. "DHS should protect PII through appropriate security safeguards against risks such as loss, unauthorized access or use, destruction, modification, or unintended or inappropriate disclosure."
• Data retention. "DHS should only retain PII for as long as is necessary to fulfill the specified purpose(s)."
• Accountability. "DHS should be accountable for complying with these principles, including by auditing the actual use of PII to demonstrate compliance with these principles and all applicable privacy protection requirements."

These baseline privacy elements for the three border surveillance technologies were not addressed in any "technology policies, standard operating procedures, directives, or other documents that direct a user in how they are to use a Technology," according to GAO's review.

CBP operates hundreds of surveillance towers along both the northern and southern borders, some of which are capable of capturing video more than seven miles away. The agency has six large aerostats (essentially tethered blimps) that use radar along the southern border, with others stationed in the Florida Keys and Puerto Rico. The agency also operates a series of smaller aerostats that stream video in the Rio Grande Valley of Texas, with the newest one installed this fall in southeastern New Mexico. And the report notes deficiencies with CBP's linear ground detection system, a network of seismic sensors and cameras that are triggered by movement or footsteps.

The GAO report underlines EFF's concerns that the privacy of people who live and work in the borderlands is violated when federal agencies deploy militarized, high-tech programs to confront unauthorized border crossings. The rights of border communities are too often treated as acceptable collateral damage in pursuit of border security.

CBP defended its practices by saying that it does, to some extent, address FIPS in its Privacy Impact Assessments, documents written for public consumption. GAO rejected this claim, saying that these assessments are not adequate in instructing agency staff on how to protect privacy when deploying the technologies and using the data that has been collected.

In its recommendations, the GAO calls on the CBP Commissioner to "require each detection, observation, and monitoring technology policy to address the privacy protections in the Fair Information Practice Principles." But EFF calls on Congress to hold CBP to account and stop approving massive spending on border security technologies that the agency continues to operate irresponsibly.

This paper’s aim is for the Local Networks initiative (LocNet) team to internally reflect on and better articulate the work we do around local innovation for community networks.

This report presents perspectives and insights on gender approaches to cybersecurity from a group of experts from different regions working on gender, feminist technology, cybersecurity policy and…

2024年12月15日、イスラエル・ネタニヤフ軍事政権は、在イスラエルのアイルランド大使館を閉鎖し、在アイルランドのイスラエル大使館を撤退させました。　しかし、アイルランドはパレスチナ支持を崩しませんでした。　そのアイルランドの、西サハラ支持を表明する外交文書が送られてきました。　紹介します。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 　　　　　　　無罪確定の報告集会で　静岡市葵区の静岡労災会館、撮影・小石 勝朗　袴田事件（１９６６年）でいったん死刑が確定した元プロボクサー、袴田巖さん（88）が再審で無罪になった。究極の刑罰である死刑が対極の無罪に覆るというあってはならない事態は、マスコミにも大きな課題を突き付けている。18年前からこの事件の取材をしてきたライターが問題提起する。異常性格者や二重人格とも　静岡地裁が無罪判決を言い渡した９月26日以降、新聞各社は相次いで袴..