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「デジタル時代における放送制度の在り方に関する検討会」（第35回） の開催

データサイエンス・オンライン講座 「社会人のためのデータサイエンス演習」の受講者募集開始

情報通信審議会　情報通信技術分科会　新世代モバイル通信システム委員会　HAPS検討作業班（第1回）の開催について

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放送事業者におけるガバナンス確保に関する検討会（第2回）配付資料

情報通信審議会　情報通信政策部会（第68回）配付資料・議事概要・議事録

令和7年度 普通交付税の算定結果等

If you thought going to a Pride event or drag show was just another night out, think again. If you were in Florida, it might land your name in a government database.

That’s what’s happening in Vero Beach, FL, where the Florida Attorney General’s office has subpoenaed a local restaurant, The Kilted Mermaid, demanding surveillance video, guest lists, reservation logs, and contracts of performers and other staff—all because the venue hosted an LGBTQ+ Pride event.

To be clear: no one has been charged with a crime, and the law Florida is likely leaning on here—the so-called “Protection of Children Act” (which was designed to be a drag show ban)—has already been blocked by federal courts as likely unconstitutional. But that didn’t stop Attorney General James Uthmeier from pushing forward anyway. Without naming a specific law that was violated, the AG’s press release used pointed and accusatory language, stating that "In Florida, we don't sacrifice the innocence of children for the perversions of some demented adults.” His office is now fishing for personal data about everyone who attended or performed at the event. This should set off every civil liberties alarm bell we have.

Just like the Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA) and other bills with misleading names, this isn’t about protecting children. It’s about using the power of the state to intimidate people government officials disagree with, and to censor speech that is both lawful and fundamental to American democracy.

Drag shows—many of which are family-friendly and feature no sexual content—have become a political scapegoat. And while that rhetoric might resonate in some media environments, the real-world consequences are much darker: state surveillance of private citizens doing nothing but attending a fun community celebration. By demanding video surveillance, guest lists, and reservation logs, the state isn’t investigating a crime, it is trying to scare individuals from attending a legal gathering. These are people who showed up at a public venue for a legal event, while a law restricting it was not even in effect. 

The Supreme Court has ruled multiple times that subpoenas forcing disclosure of members of peaceful organizations have a chilling effect on free expression. Whether it’s a civil rights protest, a church service, or, yes, a drag show: the First Amendment protects the confidentiality of lists of attendees.

Even if the courts strike down this subpoena—and they should—the damage will already be done. A restaurant owner (who also happens to be the town’s vice mayor) is being dragged into a state investigation. Performers’ identities are potentially being exposed—whether to state surveillance, inclusion in law enforcement databases, or future targeting by anti-LGBTQ+ groups. Guests who thought they were attending a fun community event are now caught up in a legal probe. These are the kinds of chilling, damaging consequences that will discourage Floridians from hosting or attending drag shows, and could stamp out the art form entirely. 

EFF has long warned about this kind of mission creep: where a law or policy supposedly aimed at public safety is turned into a tool for political retaliation or mass surveillance. Going to a drag show should not mean you forfeit your anonymity. It should not open you up to surveillance. And it absolutely should not land your name in a government database.

参政党の大躍進で２５年参院選は終わりました。ヨーロッパのメディアは日本に極右有力政党出現、と報じています。この後、この国の政治権力の一角に極右が居座るのか、今が頂点でやがて溶けてしまうのか、評価は二分していていますが、こういう政治勢力があっという間に肥大化することの気持ち悪さは拭えません。(大野和興)

　出版ネッツは、2年にわたって闘われてきた世田谷区史編纂争議の経過と成果を、記録に残すため報告集『世田谷区史編纂問題　著作者人格権をめぐる闘いの記録』を作成しました。　本書は、本編と資料編で構成しています。本編では、この闘いに心を寄せてくださった方々からのメッセージを載せています。メッセージをお寄せくださった方々に、心より御礼申し上げます。　「PART2　闘いの意義と軌跡」では、出版ネッツがどのような戦略を立て、いかに闘ってきたかについて述べています。　「PART4　集会の記..

The Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Teto (Homeless Workers’ Movement – MTST) is a grassroots urban movement in Brazil. Between 2020 and 2021, in response to the social and health crisis worsened by…

By publishing its guidelines under Article 28 of the Digital Services Act, the European Commission has taken a major step towards social media bans that will undermine privacy, expression, and participation rights for young people that are already enshrined in international human rights law. 

EFF recently submitted feedback to the Commission’s consultation on the guidelines, emphasizing a critical point: Online safety for young people must include privacy and security for them and must not come at the expense of freedom of expression and equitable access to digital spaces.

Article 28 requires online platforms to take appropriate and proportionate measures to ensure a high level of safety, privacy and security of minors on their services. But the article also prohibits targeting minors with personalized ads, a measure that would seem to require that platforms know that a user is a minor. The DSA acknowledges that there is an inherent tension between ensuring a minor’s privacy and requiring platforms to know the age of every user. The DSA does not resolve this tension. Rather, it states that service providers should not be incentivized to collect the age of their users, and Article 28(3) makes a point of not requiring service providers to collect and process additional data to assess whether a user is underage. 

Thus, the question of age checks is a key to understanding the obligations of online platforms to safeguard minors online. Our submission explained the serious concerns that age checks pose to the rights and security of minors. All methods for conducting age checks come with serious drawbacks. Approaches to verify a user’s age generally involve some form of government-issued ID document, which millions of people in Europe—including migrants, members of marginalized groups and unhoused people, exchange students, refugees and tourists—may not have access to.

Other age assurance methods, like biometric age estimation, age estimation based on email addresses or user activity, involve the processing of vast amounts of personal, sensitive data – usually in the hands of third parties. Beyond being potentially exposed to discrimination and erroneous estimations, users are asked to trust platforms’ intransparent supply chains and hope for the best. Age assurance methods always impact the rights of children and teenagers: Their rights to privacy and data protection, free expression, information and participation.

The Commission's guidelines contain a wealth of measures elucidating the Commission's understanding of "age appropriate design" of online services. We have argued that some of them, including default settings to protect users’ privacy, effective content moderation and ensuring that recommender systems’ don’t rely on the collection of behavioral data, are practices that would benefit all users. 

But while the initial Commission draft document considered age checks as only a tool to determine users’ ages to be able to tailor their online experiences according to their age, the final guidelines go far beyond that. Crucially, the European Commission now seems to consider “measures restricting access based on age to be an effective means to ensure a high level of privacy, safety and security for minors on online platforms” (page 14). 

This is a surprising turn, as many in Brussels have considered social media bans like the one Australia passed (and still doesn’t know how to implement) disproportionate. Responding to mounting pressure from Member States like France, Denmark, and Greece to ban young people under a certain age from social media platforms, the guidelines contain an opening clause for national rules on age limits for certain services. According to the guidelines, the Commission considers such access restrictions  appropriate and proportionate where “union or national law, (...) prescribes a minimum age to access certain products or services (...), including specifically defined categories of online social media services”. This opens the door for different national laws introducing different age limits for services like social media platforms. 

It’s concerning that the Commission generally considers the use of age verification proportionate in any situation where a provider of an online platform identifies risks to minors’ privacy, safety, or security and those risks “cannot be mitigated by other less intrusive measures as effectively as by access restrictions supported by age verification” (page 17). This view risks establishing a broad legal mandate for age verification measures.

It is clear that such bans will do little in the way of making the internet a safer space for young people. By banning a particularly vulnerable group of users from accessing platforms, the providers themselves are let off the hook: If it is enough for platforms like Instagram and TikTok to implement (comparatively cheap) age restriction tools, there are no incentives anymore to actually make their products and features safer for young people. Banning a certain user group changes nothing about problematic privacy practices, insufficient content moderation or business models based on the exploitation of people’s attention and data. And assuming that teenagers will always find ways to circumvent age restrictions, the ones that do will be left without any protections or age-appropriate experiences.

The Apache Software Foundationが提供するApache HTTP Serverには、RewriteCondディレクティブの実装不備が存在します。

地域力創造推進に関する研究会（第8回）