For those living in one of the 22 states where abortion is banned or heavily restricted, the internet can be a lifeline. It has essential information on where and how to access care, links to abortion funds, and guidance on ways to navigate potential legal risks. Activists use the internet to organize and build community, and reproductive healthcare organizations rely on it to provide valuable information and connect with people in need.

But both Republicans and Democrats in Congress are now actively pushing for federal legislation that could cut youth off from these vital healthcare resources and stifle online abortion information for adults and kids alike.

This summer, the U.S. Senate passed the Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA), a bill that would grant the federal government and state attorneys general the power to restrict online speech they find objectionable in a misguided and ineffective attempt to protect kids online. A number of organizations have already sounded the alarm on KOSA’s danger to online LGBTQ+ content, but the hazards of the bill don’t stop there.

KOSA puts abortion seekers at risk. It could easily lead to censorship of vital and potentially life-saving information about sexual and reproductive healthcare. And by age-gating the internet, it could result in websites requiring users to submit identification, undermining the ability to remain anonymous while searching for abortion information online.

TAKE ACTION

TELL CONGRESS: OPPOSE THE KIDS ONLINE SAFETY ACT

Abortion Information Censored

As EFF has repeatedly warned, KOSA will stifle online speech. It gives government officials the dangerous and unconstitutional power to decide what types of content can be shared and read online. Under one of its key censorship provisions, KOSA would create what the bill calls a “duty of care.” This provision would require websites, apps, and online platforms to comply with a vague and overbroad mandate to prevent and mitigate “harm to minors” in all their “design features.”

KOSA contains a long list of harms that websites have a duty to protect against, including emotional disturbance, acts that lead to bodily harm, and online harassment, among others. The list of harms is open for interpretation. And many of the harms are so subjective that government officials could claim any number of issues fit the bill.

This opens the door for political weaponization of KOSA—including by anti-abortion officials. KOSA is ambiguous enough to allow officials to easily argue that its mandate includes sexual and reproductive healthcare information. They could, for example, claim that abortion information causes emotional disturbance or death, or could lead to “sexual exploitation and abuse.” This is especially concerning given the anti-abortion movement’s long history of justifying abortion restrictions by claiming that abortions cause mental health issues, including depression and self-harm (despite credible research to the contrary).

As a result, websites could be forced to filter and block such content for minors, despite the fact that minors can get pregnant and are part of the demographic most likely to get their news and information from social media platforms. By blocking this information, KOSA could cut off young people’s access to potentially life-saving sexual and reproductive health resources. So much for protecting kids.

KOSA’s expansive and vague censorship requirements will also affect adults. To avoid liability and the cost and hassle of litigation, websites and platforms are likely to over-censor potentially covered content, even if that content is otherwise legal. This could lead to the removal of important reproductive health information for all internet users, adults included.

A Tool For Anti-Choice Officials

It’s important to remember that KOSA’s “duty of care” provision would be defined and enforced by the presidential administration in charge, including any future administration that is hostile to reproductive rights. The bill grants the Federal Trade Commission, majority-controlled by the President’s party, the power to develop guidelines and to investigate or sue any websites or platforms that don’t comply. It also grants the Executive Branch the power to form a Kids Online Safety Council to further identify “emerging or current risks of harms to minors associated with online platforms.”

Meanwhile, KOSA gives state attorneys general, including those in abortion-restrictive states, the power to sue under its other provisions, many of which intersect with the “duty of care.” As EFF has argued, this gives state officials a back door to target and censor content they don’t like, including abortion information.

It’s also directly foreseeable that anti-abortion officials would use KOSA in this way. One of the bill’s co-sponsors, Senator Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), has touted KOSA as a way to censor online content on social issues, claiming that children are being “indoctrinated” online. The Heritage Foundation, a politically powerful organization that espouses anti-choice views, also has its eyes on KOSA. It has been lobbying lawmakers to pass the bill and suggesting that a future administration could fill the Kids Online Safety Council with “representatives who share pro-life values.”

This all comes at a time when efforts to censor abortion information online are at a fever pitch. In abortion-restrictive states, officials have already been eagerly attempting to erase abortion from the internet. Lawmakers in both South Carolina and Texas have introduced bills to censor online abortion information, though neither effort has yet to be successful. The National Right to Life Committee has also created a model abortion law aimed at restricting abortion rights in a variety of ways, including digital access to information.

KOSA Hurts Anonymity Online

KOSA will also push large and important parts of the internet behind age gates. In order to determine which users are minors, online services will likely impose age verification systems, which require everyone—both adults and minors—to verify their age by providing identifying information, oftentimes including government-issued ID or other personal records.

This is deeply problematic for maintaining access to reproductive care. Age verification undermines our First Amendment right to remain anonymous online by requiring users to confirm their identity before accessing webpages and information. It would chill users who do not wish to share their identity from accessing or sharing online abortion resources, and put others’ identities at increased risk of exposure.

In a post-Roe United States, in which states are increasingly banning, restricting, and prosecuting abortions, the ability to anonymously seek and share abortion information online is more important than ever. For people living in abortion-restrictive states, searching and sharing abortion information online can put you at risk. There have been multiple instances of law enforcement agencies using digital evidence, including internet history, in abortion-related criminal cases. We’ve also seen an increase in online harassment and doxxing of healthcare professionals, even in more abortion-protective states.

Because of this, many organizations, including EFF, have tried to help people take steps to protect privacy and anonymity online. KOSA would undercut those efforts. While it’s true that our online ecosystem is already rich with private surveillance, age verification adds another layer of mass data collection. Online ID checks require adults to upload data-rich, government-issued identifying documents to either the website or a third-party verifier, creating a potentially lasting record of their visit to the website.

For abortion seekers taking steps to protect their anonymity and avoid this pervasive surveillance, this would make things all the more difficult. Using a public computer or creating anonymous profiles on social networks won’t keep you safe if you have to upload ID to access the information you need.

TAKE ACTION

TELL CONGRESS: OPPOSE THE KIDS ONLINE SAFETY ACT

We Can Still Stop KOSA From Passing

KOSA has not yet passed the House, so there’s still time to stop it. But the Senate vote means that the House could bring it up for a vote at any time, and the House has introduced its own similarly flawed version of KOSA. If we want to protect access to abortion information online, we must organize now to stop KOSA from passing.

　　日米両政府は７月28日、東京で上川外相・ブリンケン国務長官、木原防衛相・オースティン国防長官による担当閣僚会議（２＋２）を開き、自衛隊と米軍の指揮、統制の「連携強化」を確認した。今回は通常の「２＋２」（日米安全保障協議委員会）と併せ、「核の傘」を具体化する「拡大抑止閣僚会議」も初めて開催。日本の有事に「核を含む米国の軍事力」で対抗することを確認した、とされる。　岸田内閣が「戦後安保政策の大転換」を打ち出し「専守防衛」から「同盟による拡大抑止」に踏み切り、「非核三原則」も捨..

"The British and French governments are under renewed pressure after more people die trying to cross the English Channel.

The English Channel has once again become the site of tragedy, with more people dying while trying to reach the shores of the United Kingdom.

The latest incident highlights an escalating migrant crisis that is posing a challenge to both French and British authorities.

As the number of crossings surges, critics highlight the lack of cooperation between countries to address the issue.

What will it take to manage the influx of undocumented migrants?

Is targeting the criminal gangs who organise the risky journeys effective enough?

Or are governments overlooking deeper, systemic issues?"

Featuring Yasha Maccanico, Statewatch Researcher. Watch the programme here.

横河電機製「PC冗長化プラットフォーム (PC2CKM)」には、戻り値のチェック欠如に関する脆弱性が存在します。

クルド人難民のMさん一家が離散の危機に直面している。（藤ヶ谷魁）

情報通信経済研究会（令和6年度第2回）

松本総務大臣閣議後記者会見の概要

情報通信審議会　情報通信技術分科会　ITU部会（第24回）　開催案内

地方公共団体における情報セキュリティポリシーに関するガイドラインの改定等に係る検討会(第13回)

eシールに係る認定制度の関係規程策定のための有識者会議（第3回）

The post was written by Laura Vidal (PhD), independent researcher in learning and digital rights.

This is part one of a series. Part two on the legacy of Venezuela’s state surveillance is here.

As thousands of Venezuelans took to the streets across the country to demand transparency in July’s election results, the ensuing repression has been described as the harshest to date, with technology playing a central role in facilitating this crackdown.

The presidential elections in Venezuela marked the beginning of a new chapter in the country’s ongoing political crisis. Since July 28th, a severe backlash against demonstrations has been undertaken by the country’s security forces, leading to 20 people killed. The results announced by the government, in which they claimed a re-election of Nicolás Maduro, have been strongly contested by political leaders within Venezuela as well as by the Organization of American States (OAS),  and governments across the region. 

In the days following the election, the opposition—led by candidates Edmundo González Urrutia and María Corina Machado—challenged the National Electoral Council’s (CNE) decision to award the presidency to Maduro. They called for greater transparency in the electoral process, particularly regarding the publication of the original tally sheets, which are essential for confirming or contesting the election results. At present, these original tally sheets remain unpublished.

In response to the lack of official data, the coalition supporting the opposition—known as Comando con Venezuela—presented the tally sheets obtained by opposition witnesses on the night of July 29th. These were made publicly available on an independent portal named “Presidential Results 2024,” accessible to any internet user with a Venezuelan identity card.

The government responded with repression and numerous instances of technology-supported repression and violence. The surveillance and control apparatus saw intensified use, such as increased deployment of VenApp, a surveillance application originally launched in December 2022 to report failures in public services. Promoted by President Nicolás Maduro as a means for citizens to report on their neighbors, VenApp has been integrated into the broader system of state control, encouraging citizens to report activities deemed suspicious by the state and further entrenching a culture of surveillance.

Additional reports indicated the use of drones across various regions of the country. Increased detentions and searches at airports have particularly impacted human rights defenders, journalists, and other vulnerable groups. This has been compounded by the annulment of passports and other forms of intimidation, creating an environment where many feel trapped and fearful of speaking out.

The combined effect of these tactics is the pervasive sense that it is safer not to stand out. Many NGOs have begun reducing the visibility of their members on social media, some individuals have refused interviews, have published documented human rights violations under generic names, and journalists have turned to AI-generated avatars to protect their identities. People are increasingly setting their social media profiles to private and changing their profile photos to hide their faces. Additionally, many are now sending information about what is happening in the country to their networks abroad for fear of retaliation. 

These actions often lead to arbitrary detentions, with security forces publicly parading those arrested as trophies, using social media materials and tips from informants to justify their actions. The clear intent behind these tactics is to intimidate, and they have been effective in silencing many. This digital repression is often accompanied by offline tactics, such as marking the residences of opposition figures, further entrenching the climate of fear.

However, this digital aspect of repression is far from a sudden development. These recent events are the culmination of years of systematic efforts to control, surveil, and isolate the Venezuelan population—a strategy that draws from both domestic decisions and the playbook of other authoritarian regimes. 

In response, civil society in Venezuela continues to resist; and in August, EFF joined more than 150 organizations and individuals in an open letter highlighting the technology-enabled political violence in Venezuela. Read more about this wider history of Venezuela’s surveillance and civil society resistance in part two of this series, available here. 

 

　　懐かしい街をゆったりと歩いているような小説に出会う。寝っ転がって時折ふふふと頬を緩めながら読む。ごく普通の暮らしのようでいて、でもそれぞれに何かを抱えている人たちが、なんとなく知り合う。　長いアメリカ生活から離婚を機に帰国し、母校の女子大で講座を持った沙希が主人公。彼女が暮らすのは伯父の家。伯父は認知症になり施設に入所した。その家がある街が「うらはぐさ」という東京の西の穏やかな街。うらはぐさとは風知草のことで花言葉は未来…。　伯父の友人だった足袋屋の主人とその妻、沙希に懐..

Greenwashing is a well-worn strategy to try to convince the public that environmentally damaging activities aren’t so damaging after all. It can be very successful precisely because most of us don’t realize it’s happening.

Enter the Yes Men, skilled activists who specialize in elaborate pranks that call attention to corporate tricks and hypocrisy. This time, they’ve created a website – wired-magazine.com—that looks remarkably like Wired.com and includes, front and center, an op-ed from writer (and EFF Special Adviser) Cory Doctorow. The op-ed, titled “Climate change has a posse” discussed the “power and peril” of a new “greenwashing” emoji designed by renowned artist Shepard Fairey:

First, we have to ask why in hell Unicode—formerly the Switzerland of tech standards—decided to plant its flag in the greasy battlefield of eco-politics now. After rejecting three previous bids for a climate change emoji, in 2017 and 2022, this one slipped rather suspiciously through the iron gates.

Either the wildfire smoke around Unicode’s headquarters in Silicon Valley finally choked a sense of ecological urgency into them, or more likely, the corporate interests that comprise the consortium finally found a way to appease public contempt that was agreeable to their bottom line.

Notified of the spoof, Doctorow immediately tweeted his joy at being included in a Yes Men hoax.

Wired.com was less pleased. An attorney for its corporate parent, Condé  Nast (CDN) demanded the Yes Men take the site down and transfer the domain name to CDN, claiming trademark infringement and misappropriation of Doctorow’s identity, with a vague reference to copyright infringement thrown in for good measure.

As we explained in our response on the Yes Men’s behalf, Wired’s heavy-handed reaction was both misguided and disappointing. Their legal claims are baseless given the satirical, noncommercial nature of the site (not to mention Doctorow’s implicit celebration of it after the fact). And frankly, a publication of Wired’s caliber should be celebrating this form of political speech, not trying to shut it down.

Hopefully Wired and CDN will recognize this is not a battle they want or need to fight. If not, EFF stands ready to defend the Yes Men and their critical work.

Read the full report here (pdf). You can find our full annual report and accounts on the website of the Charity Commission.

Civil liberties in an era of crisis and turmoil

“It has been said that history repeats itself. This is perhaps not quite correct; it merely rhymes,” the Austrian psychoanalyst Theodor Reik once wrote. At a time of growing support for parties and movements of the extreme right, and the adoption of their ideas by mainstream political parties; rising geopolitical tension between the world’s most powerful states; outright war and military conflict; flagrant racism and xenophobia; and growing economic inequality, it is sobering to think that the 2020s may rhyme with the 1920s.

It is in this context that European states, and “the west” more broadly, are seeking to define themselves in opposition to their geopolitical foes – primarily Russia and China. Both these countries have vastly different forms of government to those of European states, marked by a disturbing level of state control over both individual and collective activities, and brutal human rights violations. Nevertheless, events in Europe increasingly appear to suggest that the differences between the “old continent” and its current rivals are of degree, rather than kind. Europe has plenty of its own authoritarian tendencies, and these are increasingly coming to the surface.

The most obvious and longstanding example is that of Hungary, where the far-right Fidesz government has been in power for over a decade. But Italy is now governed by a coalition of the far-right, with a prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, whose political life began in neo-fascist movements. Meloni, in turn, apparently forged close links with former UK prime minister Rishi Sunak, whose governing programme was largely based on trying to appease the most right-wing elements of the Conservative Party. Meanwhile, in France and Germany – the EU’s two most powerful states – the far-right is increasingly popular with the electorate. Examples abound within and without the EU, across the European continent, and beyond.

Predictions for the European Parliament elections consistently show a substantial increase in support for parties explicitly opposed to universal rights and freedoms. At the same time, amongst EU institutions and member states there is a broad consensus that forging alliances with and funding authoritarian leaders abroad is a price worth paying to halt the arrival of unwanted migrants and refugees, a policy goal that is also seeing increasing restrictions on and repression of those defending migrant and refugee rights, and those saving lives in the Mediterranean and Aegean. The ongoing attempts to delegitimise protest movements – for racial justice, action against climate change, or in solidarity with Palestine – including by painting them as extremist or even terrorist, has made the political colours of many European governments increasingly clear.

The claims advanced by European governments that they are steadfast supporters of human rights, civil liberties and democratic standards – an idea often bundled up in the phrase “European values” – is starting to ring hollow to a growing number of people. It is likely to become increasingly so for as long as governments that claim to support those values continue to undermine them domestically, and through the influence they exert over the institutions of the EU and other supranational fora. In this context, the role of an independent, critical and contentious civil society, understood in the broadest possible sense – a civil society of associations, organisations, trade unions, campaign groups, journalists, lawyers, researchers and beyond – becomes more important than ever.

Throughout 2023 we continued to support that vision of civil society. Our core tasks of reporting, documentation and analysis – focusing on police powers, border controls, state secrecy, surveillance and security technologies – have supported campaigns and movements seeking to defend and extend the values and principles that are being actively undermined by governments across the continent.

We remain a widely-used and well-respected resource: our website received almost 170,000 visits over the course of the year, our work was cited in the press more than once per fortnight, and at least 18 other civil society organisations or initiatives have publicly cited our work. We were closely involved in projects and activities undertaken by our networks, and participated in a wide range of events that helped to disseminate our work and foster the development of new ideas and projects. Our staff, trustees and contributors can be immensely proud of what we have achieved in 2023, and we are grateful to all those who supported our work, financially or otherwise.

Nevertheless, there remains much that we can do to improve, both with regard to the work we produce, and how we produce it. Some of those improvements began in 2023: at the end of the year, we employed our first ever member of staff to work on solely on communications, which in 2024 will change the way our work is publicly presented. This will help us to disseminate the findings of our research and reporting in clearer and more accessible ways, broadening our audience and aiding their understanding of our work.

We still have much to do in terms of working more closely within our networks and with organisations and associations of people at the sharp end of state power to gain a better understanding of what it is they want and need from our work. This will require increased coordination and cooperation across groups and countries, and will require us taking more time to explore topics and ideas before diving into research and writing. The increased income we have enjoyed in 2023, which we aim to see continue in 2024 and beyond, will help us with this. This will also make it possible for us to achieve the more mundane, but crucial, objective of increasing staff remuneration and conditions to a level that ensures we can recruit and retain people over the long-term – something we have made substantial progress with in recent years, but on which we still have much to do.

Ultimately, we also need to gain a better understanding of how civil society can work together in an increasingly repressive political environment to defend and, in the longer-term, extend the rights and freedoms that everyone in society should be able to exercise and enjoy. Our part in that struggle is to conduct research and investigations into policies and practices that undermine those rights and freedoms, and to oppose them through campaigning and advocacy alongside others. In the years to come, we will build on our existing knowledge, connections and practices to do that work even more effectively.

Chris Jones
Executive Director
May 2024

This is a truncated version of our annual report and accounts, which are available here.

来る９月２９日（日）、立川基地の航空祭が開催されます。毎年公称数千人の市民が訪れ、兵器展示やヘリのアクロバット飛行などを観覧するというおまつりです。