Election Security: When to Worry, When to Not

EFF update
2 months 2 weeks ago

This post was written by EFF intern Nazli Ungan as an update to a 2020 Deeplinks post by Cindy Cohn.

Everyone wants an election that is secure and reliable and that will ensure that the voters’ actual choices are reflected in the results. That’s as true as we head into the 2024 U.S. general elections as it always has been.

At the same time, not every problem in voting technology or systems is worth pulling the fire alarm—we have to look at the bigger story and context. And we have to stand down when our worst fears turn out to be unfounded.

Resilience is the key word when it comes to the security and the integrity of our elections. We need our election systems to be technically and procedurally resilient against potential attacks or errors. But equally important, we need the voting public to be resilient against false or unfounded claims of attack or error. Luckily, our past experiences and the work of election security experts have taught us a few lessons on when to worry and when to not.

See EFF's handout on Election Security here: https://www.eff.org/document/election-security-recommendations

We Need Risk-Limiting Audits

First, and most importantly, it is critical to have systems in place to support election technology and the election officials who run it. Machines may fail, humans may make errors. We cannot simply assume that there will not be any issues in voting and tabulation. Instead, there must be built-in safety measures that would catch any issues that may affect the official election results.  

It is critical to have systems in place to support election technology and the election officials who run it.

The most important of these is performing routine, post-election Risk-Limiting Audits after every election. RLAs should occur even if there is no apparent reason to suspect the accuracy of the results. Risk-limiting audits are considered the gold standard of post-election audits and they give the public justified confidence in the results. This type of audit entails manually checking randomly selected ballots until there is convincing evidence that the election outcome is correct. In many cases, it can be performed by counting only a small fraction of ballots cast making it cheap enough to be performed in every election. When the margins are tighter, a greater fraction of the votes are required to be hand counted, but this is a good thing because we want to scrutinize close contests more strictly to make sure the right person won the race. Some states have started requiring risk-limiting audits and the rest should catch up!

 We (and many others in the election integrity community) also continue to push for more transparency in election systems, more independent testing and red-team style attacks, including end-to-end pre-election testing.

And We Need A Paper Trail

Second, voting on paper ballots continues to be extremely important and the most secure strategy. Ideally, all voters should use paper ballots marked by hand, or with an assistive device, and verify their votes before casting. If there is no paper record, there is no way to perform a post-election audit, or recount votes in the event of an error or a security incident. On the other hand, if voters vote on paper, they can verify their choices are recorded accurately. More importantly, election officials can hand count a portion of the paper ballots to make sure they match with the electronic vote totals and confirm the accuracy of the election results. 

What happened in Antrim County, Michigan in the 2020 general elections illustrates the importance of paper ballots. Immediately after the 2020 elections, Antrim County published inaccurate unofficial results, and then restated these results three times to correct the errors, which led to conspiracy theories about the voting systems used there. Fortunately, Antrim County voters had voted on paper ballots, so Michigan was able to confirm the final presidential results by conducting a county-wide hand count and affirm them by a state-wide risk-limiting audit pilot. This would not have been possible without paper ballots.  

And we can’t stop there, because not every paper record is created equal. Some direct recording electronic systems are equipped with a type of Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail that make it difficult for voters to verify their selections and for election officials to use in audits and recounts. The best practice is to have all votes cast on pre-printed paper ballots, marked by hand or an assistive ballot marking device.  

Third, it is important to have the entire voting technical system under the control of election officials so that they can investigate any potential problems, which is one of the reasons why internet voting remains a bad, bad idea. There are “significant security, privacy, and ballot secrecy challenges” associated with electronic ballot return systems and they make it “possible for a single attacker to alter thousands or even millions of votes.” Maybe in the future we will have tools to limit the risks of internet voting. But until then, we should reject any proposal that includes electronic ballot return over the internet. Speaking about the internet, voting machines should never connect to the internet, dial a modem, or communicate wirelessly. 

Internet voting remains a bad, bad idea

Fourth, every part of the voting process that relies on technology must have paper backups so that voting can continue even when the machines fail. This includes paper backups for electronic pollbooks, emergency paper ballots in case voting machines fail, and provisional ballots in case there voter eligibility cannot be confirmed. 

Stay Vigilant and Informed

Fifth, we should continue to be vigilant. Election officials have come a long way from when we started raising concerns about electronic voting machines and systems. But the public should keep watching and, when warranted, not be afraid to raise or flag things that seem strange. For example, if you see something like voting machines “flipping” the votes, you should tell the poll workers. This doesn’t necessarily mean there has been a security breach; it can be as simple as a calibration error, but it can mean lost votes. Poll workers can and should address the issue immediately by providing voters with emergency paper ballots. 

Sixth, not everything that seems out of the ordinary may be reason to worry. We should build societal resistance to disinformation. CISA's Election Security Rumor vs. Reality website is a good resource that addresses election security rumors and educates us on when we need to be or don’t need to be alarmed. State-specific information is also available online. If we see or hear anything odd about what is happening at a particular locality, we should first hear what the election officials on the ground have to say about it. After all, they were there! We should also pay attention to what non-partisan election protection organizations, such as Verified Voting, say about the incident.  

The 2024 presidential election is fast approaching and there may be many claims of computer glitches and other forms of manipulation concerning our voting systems in November. Knowing when to worry and when NOT to worry will continue to be extremely important.  

In the meantime, the work of securing our elections and building resilience must continue. While not every glitch is worrisome, we should not dismiss legitimate security concerns. As often said: election security is a race without a finish line!

Guest Author

【支部リポート】神奈川　虐殺の真相究明せよ　関東大震災　犠牲者追悼会＝保坂 義久

日本ジャーナリストクラブ（JCJ）
2 months 2 weeks ago
　関東大震災当時、朝鮮人や中国人が民衆に虐殺されてから１０１年。一市民の建てた慰霊碑のある横浜市の保土谷墓地で、９月７日に犠牲者追悼会が開かれた。　毎年、この追悼会では、実行委員による朗読劇が行われてきた。今年は新しく発見された資料に基づく「呼びかけ」が、それにあたる。新資料は神奈川県知事から内務省にあてた公文書だ。虐殺された現場名や、犠牲者の特徴が記され、「呼びかけ」は追悼集会の実行委員たちにより一人ずつ読み上げられる。　「南太田町一九一二先、電車軌道内、２名虐殺される。氏..
ＪＣＪ

A Sale of 23andMe’s Data Would Be Bad for Privacy. Here’s What Customers Can Do.

EFF update
2 months 2 weeks ago

The CEO of 23andMe has recently said she’d consider selling the genetic genealogy testing company–and with it, the sensitive DNA data that it’s collected, and stored, from many of its 15 million customers. Customers and their relatives are rightly concerned. Research has shown that a majority of white Americans can already be identified from just 1.3 million users of a similar service, GEDMatch, due to genetic likenesses, even though GEDMatch has a much smaller database of genetic profiles. 23andMe has about ten times as many customers.

Selling a giant trove of our most sensitive data is a bad idea that the company should avoid at all costs. And for now, the company appears to have backed off its consideration of a third-party buyer. Before 23andMe reconsiders, it should at the very least make a series of privacy commitments to all its users. Those should include: 

  • Do not consider a sale to any company with ties to law enforcement or a history of security failures. 
  • Prior to any acquisition, affirmatively ask all users if they would like to delete their information, with an option to download it beforehand.
  • Prior to any acquisition, seek affirmative consent from all users before transferring user data. The consent should give people a real choice to say “no.” It should be separate from the privacy policy, contain the name of the acquiring company, and be free of dark patterns.
  • Prior to any acquisition, require the buyer to make strong privacy and security commitments. That should include a commitment to not let law enforcement indiscriminately search the database, and to prohibit disclosing any person’s genetic data to law enforcement without a particularized warrant. 
  • Reconsider your own data retention and sharing policies. People primarily use the service to obtain a genetic test. A survey of 23andMe customers in 2017 and 2018 showed that over 40% were unaware that data sharing was part of the company’s business model.  

23andMe is already legally required to provide users in certain states with some of these rights. But 23andMe—and any company considering selling such sensitive data—should go beyond current law to assuage users’ real privacy fears. In addition, lawmakers should continue to pass and strengthen protections for genetic privacy. 

Existing users can demand that 23andMe delete their data 

The privacy of personal genetic information collected by companies like 23andMe is always going to be at some level of risk, which is why we suggest consumers think very carefully before using such a service. Genetic data is immutable and can reveal very personal details about you and your family members. Data breaches are a serious concern wherever sensitive data is stored, and last year’s breach of 23andMe exposed personal information from nearly half of its customers. The data can be abused by law enforcement to indiscriminately search for evidence of a crime. Although 23andMe’s policies require a warrant before releasing information to the police, some other companies do not. In addition, the private sector could use your information to discriminate against you. Thankfully, existing law prevents genetic discrimination in health insurance and employment.  

What Happens to My Genetic Data If 23andMe is Sold to Another Company?

In the event of an acquisition or liquidation through bankruptcy, 23andMe must still obtain separate consent from users in about a dozen states before it could transfer their genetic data to an acquiring company. Users in those states could simply refuse. In addition, many people in the United States are legally allowed to access and delete their data either before or after any acquisition. Separately, the buyer of 23andMe would, at a minimum, have to comply with existing genetic privacy laws and 23andMe's current privacy policies. It would be up to regulators to enforce many of these protections. 

Below is a general legal lay of the land, as we understand it.  

  • 23andMe must obtain consent from many users before transferring their data in an acquisition. Those users could simply refuse. At least a dozen states have passed consumer data privacy laws specific to genetic privacy. For example, Montana’s 2023 law would require consent to be separate from other documents and to list the buyer’s name. While the consent requirements vary slightly, similar laws exist in Alabama, Arizona, California, Kentucky, Nebraska, Maryland, Minnesota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Utah, Wyoming. Specifically, Wyoming’s law has a private right of action, which allows consumers to defend their own rights in court. 
  • Many users have the legal right to access and delete their data stored with 23andMe before or after an acquisition. About 19 states have passed comprehensive privacy laws which give users deletion and access rights, but not all have taken effect. Many of those laws also classify genetic data as sensitive and require companies to obtain consent to process it. Unfortunately, most if not all of these laws allow companies like 23andMe to freely transfer user data as part of a merger, acquisition, or bankruptcy. 
  • 23andMe must comply with its own privacy policy. Otherwise, the company could be sanctioned for engaging in deceptive practices. Unfortunately, its current privacy policy allows for transfers of data in the event of a merger, acquisition, or bankruptcy. 
  • Any buyer of 23andMe would likely have to offer existing users privacy rights that are equal or greater to the ones offered now, unless the buyer obtains new consent. The Federal Trade Commission has warned companies not to engage in the unfair practice of quietly reducing privacy protections of user data after an acquisition. The buyer would also have to comply with the web of comprehensive and genetic-specific state privacy laws mentioned above. 
  • The federal Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 prevents genetic-based discrimination by health insurers and employers. 
What Can You Do to Protect Your Genetic Data Now?

Existing users can demand that 23andMe delete their data or revoke some of their past consent to research. 

If you don’t feel comfortable with a potential sale, you can consider downloading a local copy of your information to create a personal archive, and then deleting your 23andMe account. Doing so will remove all your information from 23andMe, and if you haven’t already requested it, the company will also destroy your genetic sample. Deleting your account will also remove any genetic information from future research projects, though there is no way to remove anything that’s already been shared. We’ve put together directions for archiving and deleting your account here. When you get your archived account information, some of your data will be in more readable formats than others. For example, your “Reports Summary” will arrive as a PDF that’s easy to read and includes information about traits and your ancestry report. Other information, like the family tree, arrives in a less readable format, like a JSON file.

You also may be one of the 80% or so of users who consented to having your genetic data analyzed for medical research. You can revoke your consent to future research as well by sending an email. Under this program, third-party researchers who conduct analyses on that data have access to this information, as well as some data from additional surveys and other information you provide. Third-party researchers include non-profits, pharmaceutical companies like GlaxoSmithKline, and research institutions. 23andMe has used this data to publish research on diseases like Parkinson’s. According to the company, this data is deidentified, or stripped of obvious identifying information such as your name and contact information. However, genetic data cannot truly be de-identified. Even if separated from obvious identifiers like name, it is still forever linked to only one person in the world. And at least one study has shown that, when combined with data from GenBank, a National Institutes of Health genetic sequence database, data from some genealogical databases can result in the possibility of re-identification. 

What Can 23andMe, Regulators, and Lawmakers Do?

Acquisition talk about a company with a giant database of sensitive data should be a wakeup call for lawmakers and regulators to act

As mentioned above, 23andMe must follow existing law. And it should make a series of additional commitments before ever reconsidering a sale. Most importantly, it must give every user a real choice to say “no” to a data transfer and ensure that any buyer makes real privacy commitments. Other consumer genetic genealogy companies should proactively take these steps as well. Companies should be crystal clear about where the information goes and how it’s used, and they should require an individualized warrant before allowing police to comb through their database. 

Government regulators should closely monitor the company’s plans and press the company to explain how it will protect user data in the event of a transfer of ownership—similar to the FTC’s scrutiny of the prior Facebook WhatsApp acquisition. 

Lawmakers should also work to pass stronger comprehensive privacy protections in general and genetic privacy protections in particular. While many of the state-based genetic privacy laws are a good start, they generally lack a private right of action and only protect a slice of the U.S. population. EFF has long advocated for a strong federal privacy law that includes a private right of action. 

Our DNA is quite literally what makes us human. It is inherently personal and deeply revealing, not just of ourselves but our genetic relatives as well, making it deserving of the strongest privacy protections. Acquisition talk about a company with a giant database of sensitive data should be a wakeup call for lawmakers and regulators to act, and when they do, EFF will be ready to support them. 

Mario Trujillo

Salt Typhoon Hack Shows There's No Security Backdoor That's Only For The "Good Guys"

EFF update
2 months 2 weeks ago

At EFF we’ve long noted that you cannot build a backdoor that only lets in good guys and not bad guys. Over the weekend, we saw another example of this: The Wall Street Journal reported on a major breach of U.S. telecom systems attributed to a sophisticated Chinese-government backed hacking group dubbed Salt Typhoon.

According to reports, the hack took advantage of systems built by ISPs like Verizon, AT&T, and Lumen Technologies (formerly CenturyLink) to give law enforcement and intelligence agencies access to the ISPs’ user data. This gave China unprecedented access to data related to U.S. government requests to these major telecommunications companies. It’s still unclear how much communication and internet traffic, and related to whom, Salt Typhoon accessed.

That’s right: the path for law enforcement access set up by these companies was apparently compromised and used by China-backed hackers. That path was likely created to facilitate smooth compliance with wrong-headed laws like CALEA, which require telecommunications companies to facilitate “lawful intercepts”—in other words, wiretaps and other orders by law enforcement and national security agencies. While this is a terrible outcome for user privacy, and for U.S. government intelligence and law enforcement, it is not surprising. 

The idea that only authorized government agencies would ever use these channels for acquiring user data was always risky and flawed. We’ve seen this before: in a notorious case in 2004 and 2005, more than 100 top officials in the Greek government were illegally surveilled for a period of ten months when unknown parties broke into Greece’s “lawful access” program. In 2024, with growing numbers of sophisticated state-sponsored hacking groups operating, it’s almost inevitable that these types of damaging breaches occur. The system of special law enforcement access that was set up for the “good guys” isn’t making us safer; it’s a dangerous security flaw. 

Internet Wiretaps Have Always Been A Bad Idea

Passed in 1994, CALEA requires that makers of telecommunications equipment provide the ability for government eavesdropping. In 2004, the government dramatically expanded this wiretap mandate to include internet access providers. EFF opposed this expansion and explained the perils of wiretapping the internet.  

The internet is different from the phone system in critical ways, making it more vulnerable. The internet is open and ever-changing.  “Many of the technologies currently used to create wiretap-friendly computer networks make the people on those networks more pregnable to attackers who want to steal their data or personal information,” EFF wrote, nearly 20 years ago.

Towards Transparency And Security

The irony should be lost on no one that now the Chinese government may be in possession of more knowledge about who the U.S. government spies on, including people living in the U.S., than Americans. The intelligence and law enforcement agencies that use these backdoor legal authorities are notoriously secretive, making oversight difficult. 

Companies and people who are building communication tools should be aware of these flaws and implement, where possible, privacy by default. As bad as this hack was, it could have been much worse if it wasn’t for the hard work of EFF and other privacy advocates making sure that more than 90% of web traffic is encrypted via HTTPS. For those hosting the 10% (or so) of the web that has yet to encrypt its traffic, now is a great time to consider turning on encryption, either using Certbot or switching to a hosting provider that offers HTTPS by default.

What can we do next? We must demand real privacy and security.  

That means we must reject the loud law enforcement and other voices that continue to pretend that there are “good guy only” ways to ensure access. We can point to this example, among many others, to push back on the idea that the default in the digital world is that governments (and malicious hackers) should be able to access all of our messages and files. We’ll continue to fight against US bills like EARN IT, the EU “Chat Control” file-scanning proposal, and the UK’s Online Safety Act, all of which are based on this flawed premise. 

It’s time for U.S. policymakers to step up too. If they care about China and other foreign countries engaging in espionage on U.S. citizens, it’s time to speak up in favor of encryption by default. If they don’t want to see bad actors take advantage of their constituents, domestic companies, or security agencies, again—speak up for encryption by default. Elected officials can and have done so in the past. Instead of holding hearings that give the FBI a platform to make digital wiretaps easier, demand accountability for the digital lock-breaking they’re already doing. 

The lesson will be repeated until it is learned: there is no backdoor that only lets in good guys and keeps out bad guys. It’s time for all of us to recognize this, and take steps to ensure real security and privacy for all of us.

Joe Mullin