Today, EFF joined a coalition of civil society organizations in urging UN Member States not to sign the UN Convention Against Cybercrime. For those that move forward despite these warnings, we urge them to take immediate and concrete steps to limit the human rights harms this Convention will unleash. These harms are likely to be severe and will be extremely difficult to prevent in practice.

The Convention obligates states to establish broad electronic surveillance powers to investigate and cooperate on a wide range of crimes—including those unrelated to information and communication systems—without adequate human rights safeguards. It requires governments to collect, obtain, preserve, and share electronic evidence with foreign authorities for any “serious crime”—defined as an offense punishable under domestic law by at least four years’ imprisonment (or a higher penalty).

In many countries, merely speaking freely; expressing a nonconforming sexual orientation or gender identity; or protesting peacefully can constitute a serious criminal offense per the definition of the convention. People have faced lengthy prison terms, or even more severe acts like torture, for criticizing their governments on social media, raising a rainbow flag, or criticizing a monarch. 

In today’s digital era, nearly every message or call generates granular metadata—revealing who communicates with whom, when, and from where—that routinely traverses national borders through global networks. The UN cybercrime convention, as currently written, risks enabling states to leverage its expansive cross-border data-access and cooperation mechanisms to obtain such information for political surveillance—abusing the Convention’s mechanisms to monitor critics, pressure their families, and target marginalized communities abroad.

As abusive governments increasingly rely on questionable tactics to extend their reach beyond their borders—targeting dissidents, activists, and journalists worldwide—the UN Cybercrime Convention risks becoming a vehicle for globalizing repression, enabling an unprecedented multilateral infrastructure for digital surveillance that allows states to access and exchange data across borders in ways that make political monitoring and targeting difficult to detect or challenge.

EFF has long sounded the alarm over the UN Cybercrime Treaty’s sweeping powers of cross-border cooperation and its alarming lack of human-rights safeguards. As the Convention opens for signature on October 25–26, 2025 in Hanoi, Vietnam—a country repeatedly condemned by international rights groups for jailing critics and suppressing online speech—the stakes for global digital freedom have never been higher.

The Convention’s many flaws cannot easily be mitigated because it fundamentally lacks a mechanism for suspending states that systematically fail to respect human rights or the rule of law. States must refuse to sign or ratify the Convention. 

Read our full letter here.

Knowledge production doesn’t happen in a vacuum. Every great scientific breakthrough is built on prior work, and an ongoing exchange with peers in the field. That’s why we need to address the threat of major publishers and platforms having an improper influence on how scientific knowledge is accessed—or outright suppressed.

In the digital age, the collaborative and often community-governed effort of scholarly research has gone global and unlocked unprecedented potential to improve our understanding and quality of life. That is, if we let it. Publishers continue to monopolize access to life-saving research and increase the burden on researchers through article processing charges and a pyramid of volunteer labor. This exploitation makes a mockery of open inquiry and the denial of access as a serious human rights issue.

While alternatives like Diamond Open Access are promising, crashing through publishing gatekeepers isn’t enough. Large intermediary platforms are capturing other aspects of the research process—inserting themselves between researchers and between the researchers and these published works—through platformization. 

Funneling scholars into a few major platforms isn’t just annoying, it’s corrosive to privacy and intellectual freedom. Enshittification has come for research infrastructure, turning everyday tools into avenues for surveillance. Most professors are now worried their research is being scrutinized by academic bossware, forcing them to worry about arbitrary metrics which don’t always reflect research quality. While playing this numbers game, a growing threat of surveillance in scholarly publishing gives these measures a menacing tilt, chilling the publication and access of targeted research areas. These risks spike in the midst of governmental campaigns to muzzle scientific knowledge, buttressed by a scourge of platform censorship on corporate social media.

The only antidote to this ‘platformization’ is Open Science and decentralization. Infrastructure we rely on must be built in the open and on interoperable standards, and hostile to corporate (or governmental) takeovers. Universities and the science community are well situated to lead this fight. As we’ve seen in EFF’s TOR University Challenge, promoting access to knowledge and public interest infrastructure is aligned with the core values of higher education. 

Using social media as an example, universities have a strong interest in promoting the work being done at their campuses far and wide. This is where traditional platforms fall short: algorithms typically prioritizing paid content, downrank off-site links, and prioritize sensational claims to drive engagement. When users are free from enshittification and can themselves control the  platform’s algorithms, as they can on platforms like Bluesky, scientists get more engagement and find interactions are more useful. 

Institutions play a pivotal role in encouraging the adoption of these alternatives, ranging from leveraging existing IT support to assist with account use and verification, all the way to shouldering some of the hosting with Mastodon instances and/or Bluesky PDS for official accounts. This support is good for the research, good for the university, and makes our systems of science more resilient to attacks on science and the instability of digital monocultures.

This subtle influence of intermediaries can also appear in other tools relied on by researchers, while there are a number of open alternatives and interoperable tools developed for everything from citation management, data hosting to online chat among collaborators. Individual scholars and research teams can implement these tools today, but real change depends on institutions investing in tech that puts community before shareholders.

When infrastructure is too centralized, gatekeepers gain new powers to capture, enshittify, and censor. The result is a system that becomes less useful, less stable, and with more costs put on access. Science thrives on sharing and access equity, and its future depends on a global and democratic revolt against predatory centralized platforms.

EFF is proud to celebrate Open Access Week.

Both Google and Apple are cramming new AI features into their phones and other devices, and neither company has offered clear ways to control which apps those AI systems can access. Recent issues around WhatsApp on both Android and iPhone demonstrate how these interactions can go sideways, risking revealing chat conversations beyond what you intend. Users deserve better controls and clearer documentation around what these AI features can access.

After diving into how Google Gemini and Apple Intelligence (and in some cases Siri) currently work, we didn’t always find clear answers to questions about how data is stored, who has access, and what it can be used for.

At a high level, when you compose a message with these tools, the companies can usually see the contents of those messages and receive at least a temporary copy of the text on their servers.

When receiving messages, things get trickier. When you use an AI like Gemini or a feature like Apple Intelligence to summarize or read notifications, we believe companies should be doing that content processing on-device. But poor documentation and weak guardrails create issues that have lead us deep into documentation rabbit holes and still fail to clarify the privacy practices as clearly as we’d like.

We’ll dig into the specifics below as well as potential solutions we’d like to see Apple, Google, and other device-makers implement, but first things first, here’s what you can do right now to control access:

Control AI Access to Secure Chat on Android and iOS

Here are some steps you can take to control access if you want nothing to do with the device-level AI features' integration and don’t want to risk accidentally sharing the text of a message outside of the app you’re using.

How to Check and Limit What Gemini Can Access

If you’re using Gemini on your Android phone, it’s a good time to review your settings to ensure things are set up how you want. Here’s how to check each of the relevant settings:

• Disable Gemini App Activity: Gemini App Activity is a history Google stores of all your interactions with Gemini. It’s enabled by default. To disable it, open Gemini (depending on your phone model, you may or may not even have the Google Gemini app installed. If you don’t have it installed, you don’t really need to worry about any of this). Tap your profile picture > Gemini Apps Activity, then change the toggle to either “Turn off,” or “Turn off and delete activity” if you want to delete previous conversations. If the option reads “Turn on,” then Gemini Apps Activity is already turned off. 
• Control app and notification access: You can control which apps Gemini can access by tapping your profile picture > Apps, then scrolling down and disabling the toggle next to any apps you do not want Gemini to access. If you do not want Gemini to potentially access the content that appears in notifications, open the Settings app and revoke notification access from the Google app.
• Delete the Gemini app: Depending on your phone model, you might be able to delete the Gemini app and revert to using Google Assistant instead. You can do so by long-pressing the Gemini app and selecting the option to delete. 

How to Check and Limit what Apple Intelligence and Siri Can Access

Similarly, there are a few things you can do to clamp down on what Apple Intelligence and Siri can do: 

• Disable the “Use with Siri Requests” option: If you want to continue using Siri, but don’t want to accidentally use it to send messages through secure messaging apps, like WhatsApp, then you can disable that feature by opening Settings > Apps > [app name], and disabling “Use with Siri Requests,” which turns off the ability to compose messages with Siri and send them through that app.
• Disable Apple Intelligence entirely: Apple Intelligence is an all-or-nothing setting on iPhones, so if you want to avoid any potential issues your only option is to turn it off completely. To do so, open Settings > Apple Intelligence & Siri, and disable “Apple Intelligence” (you will only see this option if your device supports Apple Intelligence, if it doesn’t, the menu will only be for “Siri”). You can also disable certain features, like “writing tools,” using Screen Time restrictions. Siri can’t be universally turned off in the same way, though you can turn off the options under “Talk to Siri” to make it so you can’t speak to it. 

For more information about cutting off AI access at different levels in other apps, this Consumer Reports article covers other platforms and services.

Why It Matters  Sending Messages Has Different Privacy Concerns than Receiving Them

Let’s start with a look at how Google and Apple integrate their AI systems into message composition, using WhatsApp as an example.

Google Gemini and WhatsApp

On Android, you can optionally link WhatsApp and Gemini together so you can then initiate various actions for sending messages from the Gemini app, like “Call Mom on WhatsApp” or “Text Jason on WhatsApp that we need to cancel our secret meeting, but make it a haiku.” This feature raised red flags for users concerned about privacy.

By default, everything you do in Gemini is stored in the “Gemini Apps Activity,” where messages are stored forever, subject to human review, and are used to train Google’s products. So, unless you change it, when you use Gemini to compose and send a message in WhatsApp then the message you composed is visible to Google.

If you turn the activity off, interactions are still stored for 72 hours. Google’s documentation claims that even though messages are stored, those conversations aren't reviewed or used to improve Google machine learning technologies, though that appears to be an internal policy choice with no technical limits preventing Google from accessing those messages.

By default, everything you do in Gemini is stored in the “Gemini Apps Activity,” where messages are stored forever, subject to human review, and are used to train Google’s products.

The simplicity of invoking Gemini to compose and send a message may lead to a false sense of privacy. Notably, other secure messaging apps, like Signal, do not offer this Gemini integration.

For comparison’s sake, let’s see how this works with Apple devices.

Siri and WhatsApp

The closest comparison to this process on iOS is to use Siri, which it is claimed, will eventually be a part of Apple Intelligence. Currently, Apple’s AI message composition tools are not available for third-party apps like Signal and WhatsApp.

According to its privacy policy, when you dictate a message through Siri to send to WhatsApp (or anywhere else), the message, including metadata like the recipient phone number and other identifiers, is sent to Apple’s servers. This was confirmed by researchers to include the text of messages sent to WhatsApp. When you use Siri to compose a WhatsApp message, the message gets routed to both Apple and WhatsApp. Apple claims it does not store this transcript unless you’ve opted into “Improve Siri and Dictation.” WhatsApp defers to Apple’s support for data handling concerns. This is similar to how Google handles speech-to-text prompts.

In response to that research, Apple said this was expected behavior with an app that uses SiriKit—the extension that allows third-party apps to integrate with Siri—like WhatsApp does.

Both Siri and Apple Intelligence can sometimes run locally on-device, and other times need to rely on Apple-managed cloud servers to complete requests. Apple Intelligence can use the company’s Private Cloud Compute, but Siri doesn’t have a similar feature.

The ambiguity around where data goes makes it overly difficult to decide on whether you are comfortable with the sort of privacy trade-off that using features like Siri or Apple Intelligence might entail.

How Receiving Messages Works

Sending encrypted messages is just one half of the privacy puzzle. What happens on the receiving end matters too. 

Google Gemini

By default, the Gemini app doesn’t have access to the text inside secure messaging apps or to notifications. But you can grant access to notifications using the Utilities app. Utilities can read, summarize, and reply to notifications, including in WhatsApp and Signal (it can also read notifications in headphones).

This could open up any notifications routed through the Utilities app to the Gemini app to access internally or from third-parties.

We could not find anything in Google’s Utilities documentation that clarifies what information is collected, stored, or sent to Google from these notifications. When we reached out to Google, the company responded that it “builds technical data protections that safeguard user data, uses data responsibly, and provides users with tools to control their Gemini experience.” Which means Google has no technical limitation around accessing the text from notifications if you’ve enabled the feature in the Utilities app. This could open up any notifications routed through the Utilities app to the Gemini app to be accessed internally or from third-parties. Google needs to publicly make its data handling explicit in its documentation.

If you use encrypted communications apps and have granted access to notifications, then it is worth considering disabling that feature or controlling what’s visible in your notifications on an app-level.

Apple Intelligence

Apple is more clear about how it handles this sort of notification access.

Siri can read and reply to messages with the “Announce Notifications” feature. With this enabled, Siri can read notifications out loud on select headphones or via CarPlay. In a press release, Apple states, “When a user talks or types to Siri, their request is processed on device whenever possible. For example, when a user asks Siri to read unread messages… the processing is done on the user’s device. The contents of the messages aren’t transmitted to Apple servers, because that isn’t necessary to fulfill the request.”

Apple Intelligence can summarize notifications from any app that you’ve enabled notifications on. Apple is clear that these summaries are generated on your device, “when Apple Intelligence provides you with preview summaries of your emails, messages, and notifications, these summaries are generated by on-device models.” This means there should be no risk that the text of notifications from apps like WhatsApp or Signal get sent to Apple’s servers just to summarize them.

New AI Features Must Come With Strong User Controls

As more device-makers cram AI features into their devices, the more necessary it is for us to have clear and simple controls over what personal data these features can access on our devices. If users do not have control over when a text leaves a device for any sort of AI processing—whether that’s to a “private” cloud or not—it erodes our privacy and potentially threatens the foundations of end-to-end encrypted communications.

Per-app AI Permissions

Google, Apple, and other device makers should add a device-level AI permission, just like they do for other potentially invasive privacy features, like location sharing, to their phones. You should be able to tell the operating system’s AI to not access an app, even if that comes at the “cost” of missing out on some features. The setting should be straightforward and easy to understand in ways the Gemini an Apple Intelligence controls currently are not.

Offer On-Device-Only Modes

Device-makers should offer an “on-device only” mode for those interested in using some features without having to try to figure out what happens on device or on the cloud. Samsung offers this, and both Google and Apple would benefit from a similar option.

Improve Documentation

Both Google and Apple should improve their documentation about how these features interact with various apps. Apple doesn’t seem to clarify notification processing privacy anywhere outside of a press release, and we couldn’t find anything about Google’s Utilities privacy at all. We appreciate tools like Gemini Apps Activity as a way to audit what the company collects, but vague information like “Prompted a Communications query” is only useful if there’s an explanation somewhere about what that means.

The current user options are not enough. It’s clear that the AI features device-makers add come with significant confusion about their privacy implications, and it’s time to push back and demand better controls. The privacy problems introduced alongside new AI features should be taken seriously, and remedies should be offered to both users and developers who want real, transparent safeguards over how a company accesses their private data and communications.

Creating and sharing knowledge are defining traits of humankind, yet copyright law has grown so restrictive that it can require acts of civil disobedience to ensure that students and scholars have the books they need and to preserve swaths of culture from being lost forever.

Reputable research generally follows a familiar pattern: Scientific articles are written by scholars based on their research—often with public funding. Those articles are then peer-reviewed by other scholars in their fields and revisions are made according to those comments. Afterwards, most large publishers expect to be given the copyright on the article as a condition of packaging it up and selling it back to the institutions that employ the academics who did the research and to the public at large. Because research is valuable and because copyright is a monopoly on disseminating the articles in question, these publishers can charge exorbitant fees that place a strain even on wealthy universities and are simply out of reach for the general public or universities with limited budgets, such as those in the global south. The result is a global human rights problem.

This model is broken, yet science goes on thanks to widespread civil disobedience of the copyright regime that locks up the knowledge created by researchers. Some turn to social media to ask that a colleague with access share articles they need (despite copyright’s prohibitions on sharing). Certainly, at least some such sharing is protected fair use, but scholars should not have to seek a legal opinion or risk legal threats from publishers to share the collective knowledge they generate.

Even more useful, though on shakier legal ground, are so-called “shadow archives” and aggregators such as SciHub, Library Genesis (LibGen), Z-Library, or Anna’s Archive. These are the culmination of efforts from volunteers dedicated to defending science.

SciHub alone handles tens of millions of requests for scientific articles each year and remains operational despite adverse court rulings thanks both to being based in Russia, and to the community of academics who see it as an ethical response to the high access barriers that publishers impose and provide it their log-on credentials so it can retrieve requested articles. SciHub and LibGen are continuations of samizdat, the Soviet-era practice of disobeying state censorship in the interests of learning and free speech.

Unless publishing gatekeepers adopt drastically more equitable practices and become partners in disseminating knowledge, they will continue to lose ground to open access alternatives, legal or otherwise.

EFF is proud to celebrate Open Access Week.

In early September, EFF submitted an amicus brief to Ecuador’s Constitutional Court supporting a constitutional challenge filed by Ecuadorian NGOs, including INREDH and LaLibre. The case challenges the constitutionality of the Ley Orgánica de Inteligencia (LOI) and its implementing regulation, the General Regulation of the LOI.

EFF’s amicus brief argues that the LOI enables disproportionate surveillance and secrecy that undermine constitutional and Inter-American human rights standards. EFF urges the Constitutional Court to declare the LOI and its regulation unconstitutional in their entirety.

More specifically, our submission notes that:

“The LOI presents a structural flaw that undermines compliance with the principles of legality, legitimate purpose, suitability, necessity, and proportionality; it inverts the rule and the exception, with serious harm to rights enshrined constitutionally and under the Convention; and it prioritizes indeterminate state interests, in contravention of the ultimate aim of intelligence activities and state action, namely the protection of individuals, their rights, and freedoms.”

Core Legal Problems Identified

Vague and Overbroad Definitions

The LOI contains key terms like “national security,” “integral security of the State,” “threats,” and “risks” that are left either undefined or so broadly framed that they could mean almost anything. This vagueness grants intelligence agencies wide, unchecked discretion, and fails short of the standard of legal certainty required under the American Convention on Human Rights (CADH).

Secrecy and Lack of Transparency

The LOI makes secrecy the rule rather than the exception, reversing the Inter-American principle of maximum disclosure, which holds that access to information should be the norm and secrecy a narrowly justified exception. The law establishes a classification system—“restricted,” “secret,” and “top secret”—for intelligence and counterintelligence information, but without clear, verifiable parameters to guide its application on a case-by-case basis. As a result, all information produced by the governing body (ente rector) of the National Intelligence System is classified as secret by default. Moreover, intelligence budgets and spending are insulated from meaningful public oversight, concentrated under a single authority, and ultimately destroyed, leaving no mechanism for accountability.

Weak or Nonexistent Oversight Mechanisms

The LOI leaves intelligence agencies to regulate themselves, with almost no external scrutiny. Civilian oversight is minimal, limited to occasional, closed-door briefings before a parliamentary commission that lacks real access to information or decision making power. This structure offers no guarantee of independent or judicial supervision and instead fosters an environment where intelligence operations can proceed without transparency or accountability.

Intrusive Powers Without Judicial Authorization

The LOI allows access to communications, databases, and personal data without prior judicial order, which enables the mass surveillance of electronic communications, metadata, and databases across public and private entities—including telecommunication operators. This directly contradicts rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which establish that any restriction of the right to privacy must be necessary, proportionate, and subject to independent oversight. It also runs counter to CAJAR vs. Colombia, which affirms that intrusive surveillance requires prior judicial authorization.

International Human Rights Standards Applied

Our amicus curiae draws on the CAJAR vs. Colombia judgment, which set strict standards for intelligence activities. Crucially, Ecuador’s LOI fall short of all these tests: it doesn’t constitute an adequate legal basis for limiting rights; contravenes necessary and proportionate principles; fails to ensure robust controls and safeguards, like prior judicial authorization and solid civilian oversight; and completely disregards related data protection guarantees and data subject’s rights.

At its core, the LOI structurally prioritizes vague notions of “state interest” over the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It legalizes secrecy, unchecked surveillance, and the impunity of intelligence agencies. For these reasons, we urge Ecuador’s Constitutional Court to declare the LOI and its regulations unconstitutional, as they violate both the Ecuadorian Constitution and the American Convention on Human Rights (CADH).

Read our full amicus brief here to learn more about how Ecuador’s intelligence framework undermines privacy, transparency, and the human rights protected under Inter-American human rights law.